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This paper employs a panel regression analysis using county-level data to 
quantify the relative importance of competing forestry and agricultural 
policy incentives in explaining trends in private afforestation in Ireland. It 
concludes that an increase in the level of up front payments to planters is the 
most cost efficient way of increasing planting levels. The introduction of the 
Irish agri-environment programme REPS has contributed to a significant 
decline in the level of forestry planting and offset the recent increases in the 
level of forestry grants and premia. Several policy reforms to encourage 
forestry planting in Ireland are proposed, including greater integration of 
forestry with the REPS scheme and increasing the value of the initial 
payment which farmers receive. 
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Ireland has shorter rotation periods for forestry than many other European 
countries yet, despite this, it is the least forested country within the EU. 
Since the 1940s, the Irish government has promoted afforestation with 
mixed success. Recent planting trends are shown in Figure 1. Throughout 
the 1980s afforestation rates remained low and most new planting was 
undertaken by the public sector. The rate of afforestation began to increase 
from the mid-1980s, driven largely by an increase in private afforestation. 
The upsurge in private forestry planting was mainly due to the introduction 
of a number of government incentives with support from the EU. The first 
such programme, the Western Package Scheme, was introduced in 1981 and 
provided forestry grants to farmers in disadvantaged areas largely in the 
western parts of the country. There was a relatively low take-up of this 
programme mainly because farmers faced a lack of income for the first 20 
years after planting. A first attempt was made to address this problem in 
1987 when these farmers who planted forestry were made eligible to receive 
cattle headage payments for a period of 15 years.  
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
However, it was the introduction of the Forest Premium Scheme in 1989 
open to farmers in all parts of the country who planted forestry which first  
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attracted significant farmer interest. This scheme gave farmers annual 
payments for the first 15 years after planting conifers and 20 years after 
planting broadleaves. Figure 1 shows the sharp increase in the level of 
private afforestation in the early 1990s and the total annual area afforested 
reached almost 25,000 ha in 1995. On the basis of these achievements, the 
Government’s 1996 afforestation plan set national planting targets of 20,000 
ha per annum from 2001-2030 (Department of Agriculture, Food and 
Forestry, 1996). These targets were reaffirmed in the National Development 
Plan 2000-2006 (Department of Finance, 1999). 
 
Since 1995, however, private forestry planting has declined sharply in spite 
of large increases in the level of forestry grants and premia. Public 
afforestation undertaken by Coillte, the forestry company which manages 
the state-owned forests, has virtually ceased. It now concentrates on 
reforestation of existing plantation areas and co-operative partnerships with 
the private sector. It is unlikely that Coillte will be involved in future land 
acquisition for public afforestation because public planting is no longer 
eligible for state grant and premia payments, as well as because of 
increasing land prices. The vast majority of forestry planting in Ireland is 
now carried out by farmers on land previously utilised for agriculture. Thus, 
the area planted to new forestry is sensitive not only to the level of forestry 
incentives but also to the competing incentives attached to agricultural 
production. Particularly in the latter period, there have been significant 
increases in the amount of direct payments to farmers related to farm 
production and agri-environment policies. The purpose of this paper is to  
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measure the strength of these competing influences on the level of private 
afforestation in Ireland over the past two decades. There is just one previous 
study which used time series regression analysis of aggregate national-level 
data to explain varying levels of Irish afforestation over time (Barrett and 
Trace, 1999). They found that the forestry premia had relatively limited 
influence on afforestation levels compared to agricultural subsidies and agri-
environment payments. However, none of their explanatory variables were 
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance and the 
analysis suffered from the relatively short time series available using 
aggregate data. 
 
This paper exploits the fact that forestry planting data are available at a 
county level (there are 26 counties in Ireland), and that both forestry 
subsidies and the strength of competing agricultural incentives vary across 
counties, to estimate a combined time-series and cross-section panel 
regression model, thus considerably increasing the number of observations 
and the robustness of the resulting estimates. The next section discusses the 
policy variables affecting afforestation levels in greater detail. Section 3 
discusses the data and methodology used in the analysis. The main results 
are reported in Section 4, while the concluding section reviews the policy 






2.  Policy influences on private afforestation  
 
Forestry Subsidisation 
The two main policy incentives to promote private afforestation are a 
forestry planting grant and a forest premium. In addition, the Irish taxation 
system favours forestry as a land use and forestry receives a number of tax 
incentives and exemptions. Private forestry grants have been in place in 
Ireland since the 1920s and are generally paid in several instalments. The 
first payment is known as the planting grant, which covers the main planting 
expenses, and is paid on completion of planting. The subsequent grants, 
known as maintenance grants, are paid a specified number of years after 
planting occurs and are intended to cover the main costs of maintaining the 
forest in its early years. Grant rates were low in the early years, and the first 
significant increase took place in 1978 when the grant was increased from 
£86 to £222 per hectare (all amounts refer to Irish pounds). Under the 
Western Package Scheme from 1982, forestry grants up to a maximum of 
£800 per ha were paid to farmers in disadvantaged areas, while farmers in 
other areas were eligible for a forestry grant not exceeding £308 per ha. A 
unified scheme was introduced in 1991 which distinguished only between 
previously enclosed or unenclosed land and, since then, forestry grants have 
been regularly increased. In 2001, maximum grants for unenclosed land 
were £2,150 per ha, increasing to £3,900 for broadleaf trees (for oak and 
beech £5,000 and £5,300 respectively) (Teagasc, 1999). Because of the 
small-scale nature of farm forestry in Ireland and the lack of forestry  
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knowledge, it has been usual for planting to be undertaken by specialist 
companies in return for payment by the farmer to them of the planting grant. 
As noted earlier, the Forest Premium Scheme under Council Regulation 
EEC 1609/89 replaced the more limited headage payment scheme in 1989 
and, since then, all farmers have been eligible for annual payments. The 
conditions attached to these payments and the payment amounts have varied 
and been increased over time, distinguishing between the nature of the land 
planted to forestry and whether the farmer had off-farm income or not. The 
scheme was extended to non-farmers and companies in 1994 at reduced 
rates. The forestry schemes are financed 75 per cent from the EU FEOGA 




Direct payments to farmers increased significantly in importance following 
the MacSharry CAP reform in 1993 and again following the Agenda 2000 
reform in 1999. To the extent that these payments merely compensated for 
reductions in support prices, they did not alter the relative attractiveness of 
agricultural production vis a vis forestry. However, the addition of stocking 
density criteria to determine eligibility for compensatory payments, and the 
payment of an additional extensification premium where stocking densities  
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are further reduced, has increased the value of marginal agricultural land to 
farmers.
1 
The main payment scheme which has influenced levels of afforestation has 
been the Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS). This is the Irish 
implementation of the EU agri-environment Regulation 2078/1992 and has 
been in operation since 1994. Under this scheme farmers receive a basic 
premium of £119 per ha up to a maximum of 40 hectares, subject to a 
maximum of £4756 per annum (Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Development, 2001a). By the end of 1999, 40,550 applicants and 1.6 
million hectares of land, amounting to 33 per cent of total utilisable 
agricultural land, had been approved for REPS (Department of Agriculture, 
Food and Rural Development, 2000b; 2001a). The CAP Rural Development 
Plan 2000-2006 forecasts that 70,000 farmers, or half of the farming 
                                                 
1 The extensification premium is payable to producers of suckler cows qualifying for the 
Suckler Cow Premium and male cattle qualifying for the Special Beef Premium 
(Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, 2001b). The premium is paid to 
farmers who keep their livestock numbers under a set target per hectare. In order to obtain 
the extensification premium, the farmer must reduce his/her livestock units per hectare, 
either by reducing the number of livestock or alternatively by acquiring additional 
agricultural land. It was not possible to introduce the effect of the extensification premium 
directly into our regression model. However, as it has been estimated that up to 1 million 
hectares could be placed under forestry without reducing the available extensification 
premia or other farm income (Kearney and O'Connor, 1993), the omission of this variable 
from the analysis may be defended. 
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population, will have entered their land into REPS by 2006 (Department of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, 2000a). Although there is no 
restriction on planting forestry on land entered into REPS, farmers cannot 
receive both REPS premia and forestry premia on the same land. This 
means that there is serious competition between forestry and REPS for land. 
REPS has the additional attraction for farmers in that land is enrolled only 
for a five-year period after which it can be withdrawn, unlike the decision to 
plant trees which is irreversible.
2 REPS thus enables farmers to postpone 
their decision to put land under forestry while still receiving annual 
payments. 
 
The main purpose of our analysis is to try to quantify the relative 
importance of these policy factors in influencing the amount of land devoted 
to forestry. Specifically, we are interested in the strength of the competing 
subsidies paid to farmers for agricultural production and the provision of 
environmental services relative to forestry, as well as the relative 
importance of the forestry grant and forest premium in influencing farmers’ 






                                                 
2  Currently, there is a legal requirement to replant forestry land, and planters replanting 
forestry are not entitled to a full planting grant or annual premia.  
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3.  Data and Methodology 
 
The afforestation regression model assumes that farmers weigh up the 
competing returns from forestry and agricultural production in deciding 
whether to plant trees or not. The forestry returns are composed of the net 
revenue from the sale of timber over the lifetime of the forest, the forestry 
grant and the forest premium. Agricultural returns are proxied by the gross 
margin obtained from cattle and sheep production, which are the most 
common enterprises found on the marginal land in Ireland most likely to be 
used for forestry. In addition, account is taken of the competing attraction of 
enrolling land in REPS.   
 
In principle, the level of tax incentive would also be a relevant variable to 
include but previous analysis of private forestry in Northern Ireland did not 
find that tax incentives were a significant explanatory variable (Kula and 
McKillop, 1988; Kula, 1998). A possible explanation is that private forestry 
in Northern Ireland, as in the Republic, is dominated by small-scale planters 
who are unlikely to have significant tax liabilities. For this reason, taxation 
was not included as a separate variable in this regression analysis. The 
forestry land price is another variable which might influence the level of 
private forestry planted. However, values for this variable are not available 
at a county level.  
 
Other non-quantifiable factors that influence the level of private forestry 
planted by a typical farmer include the level of risk associated with planting  
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forestry and cultural attitudes held by farmers towards forestry. These 
cultural attitudes have been identified as factors that may reduce the level of 
forestry planting in Ireland in recent surveys of Irish farmers' attitudes to 
planting trees (Gardiner and Ni Dhubhain, 1994; Frawley and Leavy, 1999; 
Clinch et al., 2000). In addition, there is evidence that these attitudes vary 
across counties. It is not possible to include these factors in this regression 
analysis, as these factors cannot be measured in a numerical manner. It is 
likely, however, if these are significant factors impeding private 
afforestation, then the negative impact of agricultural environmental 
schemes such as REPS which do not have risk or negative cultural attitudes 
associated with them will be even stronger. 
 
Data and the Regression Model 
The data sample covers the time period 1982-1999 for the twenty-six 
counties of the Republic of Ireland with the explanatory variables where 
appropriate expressed in 1999 constant prices. Data for 2000 became 
available after the analysis was completed and have been used as a test of 
the predictive ability of the model. The model to be estimated can be written 
as: 
 
(1) ) AreaREPS , Agrimargin , Forsub , Forplantgr , n f(Formargi Priv it it it it it it     =  
 
where 
Privit = the number of hectares planted with private forestry in county i in 
year t  
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Formarginit = the level of the expected forestry market margin achieved per 
hectare in county i in year t 
Forplantgrit = the level of the forestry planting grant per hectare in county i  
in year t 
Forsubit = the level of forestry subsidies per hectare in county i in year t 
Agrimarginit = the agricultural gross margin per hectare in county i in year t 
AreaREPSit = the area of land entered into REPS in hectares in county i in 
year t. 
 
Panel Model Specification 
The model is estimated as a fixed effects model in which planters in each 
county are assumed to respond in the same way to changes in the 
explanatory variables, but there are fixed (constant) differences in planting 
levels across counties due to unspecified county differences. The alternative 
panel model specification is a random effects model. Whether to treat the 
individual effects as fixed or random is not an easy question to answer and it 
can make a significant difference to the coefficient estimates especially if 
there are relatively few observations across time. The most appropriate 
methodology is often to judge this decision on ‘the true nature’ of these 
effects (Verbeek, 2000). The fixed effects model is appropriate if the cross-
sectional terms are ‘one of a kind’ and cannot be viewed as a random draw 
from the underlying population. This is the case for this analysis where all 
the cross-sectional terms represent counties. However, diagnostic testing is 
carried out to determine the (un)suitability of the fixed effects model for this 
analysis. The model is estimated as the least square dummy variable  
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(LSDV) model by ordinary least squares (OLS) in which each county 
(except one) is represented by a dummy variable. A log-log regression 
model is used, as this is consistent with previous regression analysis in this 
area and because of the significant differences in the absolute values of the 
independent variables in levels. Thus the coefficient estimates can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
 
The Level of Private Forestry Planting 
Data on private afforestation by county was obtained from the Forest 
Service’s Forestry Statistics 1999 (Forest Service, 1999). Because there was 
no private planting in some counties in the early years of the sample period, 
to avoid the problem of taking the log of a zero number it was assumed that 
a hundredth of a hectare was planted in each county where no planting took 
place in the years 1982-1988.  
 
The Expected Forestry Market Margin 
The net returns from timber production (called here the forestry market 
margin) are based on the difference between timber revenue and costs. 
There are two main sources of revenue from timber production, namely, 
thinnings and clearcutting revenue. When planting, a farmer must anticipate 
the likely timber price in the future over the rotation period. The assumption 
is made that the farmer’s price expectation is determined by the average of 
the current year’s and previous four years’ prices. This assumption can be 
defended as long-range forecasts for timber prices suggest that they will 
remain constant in real terms (Clinch, 1999). Revenue depends on the  
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species planted, the average yield class per county, the timber price, the 
number of trees per hectare and the average volume of timber per tree.
3 The 
costs include establishment costs, fencing, brashing, road and drain repairs, 
road construction and maintenance costs as well as the costs of marking and 
measuring the trees for thinning. Although revenue differs across counties 
depending on the average yield class achievable in each county, it was 
assumed that costs would not differ across yield classes.
4 The forestry 
market margin between the year of planting 0 and the year of clearcutting n 
is expressed in Net Present Value (NPV) terms by discounting by 5 per cent. 
A 5 per cent discount rate is chosen to represent the long-term opportunity 
cost to private individuals of putting money into forestry in Ireland and it is 
also the discount rate used to assess government policy proposals. 
 
NPV of the forestry market margin = ∑ = +
− n
i i
i i C R
0 ) 05 . 1 (
         (2) 
 
To make the forestry market margin more comparable with the agricultural 
gross margin, the NPV is expressed as an annual annuity of 5 per cent in the 
                                                 
3 Thinning is the cutting out of selected trees from a plantation to improve the growth and 
quality of the remaining trees (Kula, 1988).  The yield class of a tree is a measure of the 
quantity of the timber produced from a stand of a tree as a function of time (Clinch, 1999). 
It is assumed that Sitka Spruce is planted as this is still the most popular species planted in 
Ireland. 
4  County yield classes were calculated for Sitka Spruce from data provided directly by 
Coillte.  
14 
regression analysis and this is known as the expected forestry market 
margin. 
 
The Forestry Planting Grant 
The forestry planting grant is paid by the government to planters to cover 
plantation and establishment costs. It is 75 per cent of the total forestry grant 
and is paid on the completion of planting. For the period 1982-1990 planting 
grants differed across counties depending on whether the land afforested 
was classified as a disadvantaged area or a non-disadvantaged area under 
the EU Less Favoured Areas Directive 85/350. Farmers and non-farmers 
who planted forestry in areas classified as disadvantaged were eligible to 
receive grants under the more generous Western Package Scheme. In 1991, 
a new overall scheme was introduced for all counties in which the new 
levels of forestry planting grants just depended on whether the land planted 
was previously enclosed or unenclosed. The Forest Service’s Forestry 
Statistics provide data on the percentages of total forestry that is planted on 
enclosed and unenclosed land at a county level in Ireland. It was assumed 
that these percentages also applied to private planting and, on this basis, it 
was possible to calculate county-specific planting grants for the period 




Forestry subsidies are defined as the combination of forestry maintenance 
grants and forest premia payments (or compensatory headage payments in  
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the early years of the sample period). Maintenance grants are paid a 
specified number of years after planting occurs. Since the introduction of 
the Western Package Scheme maintenance grants have been 25 per cent of 
total forestry grants paid to planters. Headage payments paid in the period 
1987-1989 were only paid in counties classified as disadvantaged.
5 Forest 
premia payments differ by county in the period 1990-1993 depending on the 
proportions of enclosed and unenclosed land in each county, and after 1994 
depending on the classification of the area in each county as more severely 
handicapped, less severely handicapped or non-disadvantaged land under 
the Less Favoured Areas Directive. The premium associated with the 
majority classification was assigned to each county. The current levels of 
premia were introduced in late 1999. At this time the eligibility criteria were 
altered so that the premia no longer differed across soil classifications. The 
NPV of forestry subsidies over the rotation period was calculated using the 
discount rate of 5 per cent. 
 
The Agricultural Gross Margin 
The agricultural gross margin used is a county-specific weighted gross 
margin of different sheep and beef farming systems, as these are the two 
main agricultural enterprises competing with forestry in Ireland. The 
weighting of the gross margins depends on the farming systems which are 
                                                 
5 This land was marginal agricultural which had to be classified as disadvantaged under the 
EEC Directive 85/350.   
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most prevalent in each county. Data were provided from the FAPRI-Ireland 
model database maintained by Teagasc.
6  
 
The Area Entered into REPS 
The area entered into REPS is included as a separate variable using the 
annual area of land entered into REPS at a county level for the years 1994-
1999.
7 The means and standard deviations for the variables used in the 
analysis are shown in Table 1.
8 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
6 Data provided by private communication by Julian Binfield, Rural Economy Research 
Centre, Teagasc. 
7 It was not possible to use Department of Agriculture statistics on payments to REPS 
farmers by county for this purpose.  The Department does not calculate the annual area of 
land entered into REPS at a county level but the annual area of land on which REPS 
subsidies are paid.  Because REPS payments may be paid more than once in a year and 
because of delays between enrolling land and receiving payments, the subsidy data are an 
unreliable measure of the annual amount of land enrolled in REPS.  Instead, Department 
data on the cumulative amount of land in each county enrolled in REPS each year was used 
in conjunction with the annual percentage changes in the national amount of land enrolled 
annually in REPS to derive county-specific estimates of the amount of land entered into 
REPS each year. 
8 All the means and standard deviations of the variables used for this regression analysis are 
calculated over the period 1982-1999, with the exception of the area entered into REPS. Its 
mean and standard deviation are calculated over the period 1994-1999 as REPS was only 
introduced in 1994.   
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4.  Discussion of results 
 
Diagnostic Testing 
The regression results are shown in Table 2. The validity of the fixed effects 
specification was tested using a Hausmann Test. The null hypothesis of no 
correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory variables was 
rejected at a 5 per cent significance level, indicating support for the fixed 
effects specification. Diagnostic testing for the presence of autocorrelation 
or heteroscedasticity in the residuals was carried out using Lagrange 
Multiplier tests. While the presence of autocorrelation was rejected, 
heteroscedasticity could not be and, to take account of this, White’s robust 
standard errors were used. In terms of goodness of fit, the overall R
2 and 
within R
2 for this model would seem to suggest a reasonable representation 
of the underlying data. All the variables have their expected signs and the p-
value associated with the F-statistic, which measures the probability of all 
the coefficients being simultaneously zero, is zero. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Statistical Significance of Results 
Four variables are shown to be statistically significant in explaining private 
afforestation at a 1 per cent significance level: the forestry planting grant, 
forestry subsidies, the expected forestry market margin and the area entered 
into REPS.  
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The agricultural gross margin, though appearing with the expected sign, was 
not found to be a statistically significant explanatory factor. This is not an 
unexpected result as the higher level of forestry planting in the early 1990s, 
when taken in conjunction with the upward trend in livestock units, 
indicates that overall competition between forestry and agriculture did not 
prove to be very restrictive at least up to and including 1995 (Kearney, 
2001). The recent developments in both sectors imply greater use being 
made of previously under-utilised or waste land resources (Kearney, 2001). 
Increasingly, as the standards for plantable land are raised, as other possible 
areas are precluded from forestry on environmental grounds, and less 
marginal land remains available, the competition for land between 
agriculture and forestry will intensify (Kearney, 1999).  
 
The Forestry Planting Grant and Subsidies 
To explain the results, the example of the forestry planting grant can be 
taken. This variable’s coefficient is 2.83 which means that a 1 per cent 
increase in the level of forestry planting grant calculated at the sample mean 
would lead to a 2.83 per cent increase in the level of private afforestation. 
This value can be converted into a marginal effect, measuring the response 
to a unit increase in the planting grant. This is done by dividing the elasticity 
by the ratio of the means of the dependent variable and the independent 
variable.
9 Because the dependent variable is the annual planting by county, 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of the results reported in Table 3, the time period is restricted to 1994-
1999 in order to be consistent across all variables, as the Area under REPS variable only  
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to convert this to a national figure it is multiplied by 26. The marginal effect 
of the forestry planting grant is 25.75, which is interpreted to mean that 
every £1 increase in the value of the forestry planting grant leads to a 25.75 
hectare increase in the national annual level of private afforestation (see 
Table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The marginal effect of forestry subsidies is 11.63, meaning that every £1 
increase in the NPV of these subsidies leads to a further 11.63 hectares of 
forestry at a national level. The marginal effect for the forestry planting 
grant is 2.2 times the marginal effect for the expected forestry margin for 
equivalent changes in expenditure measured in net present value terms.
 10   
 
These are the appropriate figures for making comparisons with the 
afforestation effect of equivalent government expenditure on planting grants 
and forestry subsidies, but it is not so easy to interpret in policy terms. 
Policy-makers think in terms of the effect of a £1 increase in the planting 
grant relative to a £1 increase in annual forest premium payment, but 
because the latter is paid over a number of years, this is not comparing like 
                                                                                                                            
exists for this time period.  However, for the other variables the reported values differ little 
from those calculated using the entire sample period. 
10 For the purpose of calculating the marginal effects with respect to a unit change in the 
forestry market margin NPV, the estimated coefficient which refers to the annuity 
equivalent is multiplied by 20.  
20 
with like. By noting that the NPV of a £1 increase in the annual forestry 
premium paid over 20 years is £13.09, it is easy to calculate that the national 
increase in afforestation as a result of a £1 increase in the annual forestry 
premium is 11.63 x 13.09 or 152.24 hectares. This is clearly a larger effect 
than would be achieved by increasing the planting grant by £1. However, in 
order to increase private afforestation by the same amount the forestry 
planting grant would just need to be increased by £5.91, which is less than 
half the NPV of the government outlay on the forest premium. Increasing 
the forestry planting grant is a more cost effective method of increasing the 
level of private forestry planted than increasing the annual forestry premia 
from the state’s point of view. Note that this is a marginal effect taking the 
existing mix of planting grant and premia as given. It does not overturn the 
historical evidence that little private planting took place before farmers 
became entitled to some form of annual premium payment. 
 
The Expected Forestry Market Margin 
The marginal effect of the expected forestry market margin is also positive 
but, at just over 2 hectares for every £1 increase in the annual annuity, its 
economic significance (as opposed to its statistical significance) is very 
limited. For example, an increase of 1948 per cent on 1999 levels in this 
margin would be needed to increase private afforestation significantly from 
1999 planting levels in order to meet the government’s planting target. Most 
forestry experts concur that the vast majority of farmers do not consider the 
forestry market margin when deciding whether to plant their land. Farmers 
appear to consider only the payments of forestry grants and premia for the  
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next twenty years rather than the final timber revenue which will not be 
received for at least 40 years.  
 
The Area Entered into REPS 
Finally, the marginal effect of land entered into REPS is interpreted to mean 
that for every hectare of land enrolled in REPS that there will be a 0.02 
hectare decrease in the level of private afforestion. The annual average area 
entered into REPS in the period between 1994-1999 was 266,667 hectares. 
Taken together with the size of the calculated marginal effect, this would 
suggest a reduction in the level of private forestry planted by 5,333 hectares 
on average per annum due to this policy. The introduction of REPS has been 
one of the main factors that has led to the decline in the level of private 
forestry planting in recent years. This effect is in part due to the sheer 
volume of land entering into REPS and the decreasing stock of marginal 
land available for other uses. The introduction of REPS explains the 
ineffectual nature of recent increases in the level of forestry premia and 
grants.  
 
Although the most recent grant and premia increases in late 1999 were not 
included in the regression analysis, these increases can be used in an attempt 
to predict the level of private forestry planting in 2000. These increases are 
estimated to lead to an extra 19,365 hectares of private forestry planting in 
2000, ceteris paribus. In the year 2000, however, 466,000 hectares of land 
were entered into REPS which is estimated to lead to a decline of 9,320 
hectares in the level of private forestry planting. Overall, the model  
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estimates that, in 2000, private forestry planting should have increased by 
approximately 10,045 hectares. The actual figure was 2,454 hectares. 
Therefore, it seems that this regression model over-projects the level of 
private forestry planting in Ireland for the year 2000. However, the increases 
that took place were very significant and occurred very late in 1999 and 
therefore it is likely that there will be a lagged response to these increases 
from farmers due to information and time lags.
11 
 
5.  Policy Implications and Conclusions  
This paper has identified the factors influencing the level of private forestry 
planting in Ireland. These factors are the forestry planting grant, the level of 
forestry subsidies, the expected forestry market margin and the area entered 
into REPS. If the national afforestation target of 20,000 ha is to be met, then 
changes in one or more of these variables will be necessary. Although this 
paper suggests methods of increasing the level of forestry planting in Ireland 
in order to meet this target, it should be noted that an examination of 
whether this target is the optimal level of forestry planting is beyond the 
scope of this paper.
12  
                                                 
11 Lags were not introduced into this regression model due to time series data limitations.  
12 This paper has not discussed whether there are net economic or environmental benefits to 
planting additional forestry in Ireland. It would be necessary to review both the positive and 
negative environmental and economic effects of planting forestry in order to ascertain the 




Relative Significance of the Expected Forestry Market Margin 
The marginal effects of the forestry planting grant and forestry subsidies 
variables in comparison to the expected forestry market margin variable 
confirms the necessity of state support for the private forestry sector if the 
forest area is to increase. It seems clear from this analysis that increases in 
the forestry market margin alone would not substantially increase the level 
of private forestry planting. 
 
Forestry Subsidies vs the Forestry Planting Grant 
The panel regression analysis suggests that, although increasing the forestry 
annual premium payment by £1 will be nearly six times as effective as a £1 
increase in the forestry planting grant, the most cost efficient method of 
increasing private forestry planting in Ireland is to increase the forestry 
planting grant when both incentives are compared in terms of their NPV 
cost to the state. This might be seen as a counter-intuitive finding, given that 
farmers in the past often simply passed on the grant to the planting 
contractor. However, there are at least two ways in which higher planting 
grants tended to stimulate higher levels of private planting. First, with 
higher grants, contractors would have had a greater incentive to seek out 
farmers to encourage them to sign up for the scheme. Second, in some cases 
farmers retained a portion of the grant through supplying their own labour 
or other services to the contractor.  
 
It is evident from this regression analysis that upfront payments paid in the 
early years of planting may be both a persuasive and cost efficient method  
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of increasing the level of private forestry planting. This is because the 
planter receives the payments immediately and they do not suffer from any 
risk of changes in government policy or from devaluation due to inflation. 
Since the most recent increase in forestry grants in late 1999, grant 
payments are now related entirely to the actual costs incurred. Therefore, 
increasing forestry planting grant payments cannot be pursued as an 
incentive measure in order to increase the level of forestry planting in 
Ireland. Tiering the premium payments over time so that a higher proportion 
of their value was paid in the earlier years would have a similar effect, 
although this may conflict with the income maintenance objective of these 
payments. 
 
The growth of private afforestation and ever increasing land prices 
contributed to Coillte changing its focus from purely public forestry to 
partnership with the private forestry sector in Ireland. This partnership 
materialised in a number of schemes including Coillte’s Farm Partnership 
Scheme and the Private Forestry Scheme. The Farm Partnership Scheme 
was introduced in 1992 and has proven particularly popular. On entering the 
Farm Partnership Scheme the landowner receives an up front payment of 
currently £500 per hectare and tax-free income throughout the rotation of 
the forest. The landowner continues to receive the applicable forestry 
premia for 20 or 15 years depending on whether the owner is a farmer or a 
non-farmer. The landowner receives 80 per cent of the thinning profits and 
this amount, known as the thinning annuity, is paid annually from the year 
the premia cease until clearfell. The landowner also receives 55 per cent of  
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the clearfell profits. The landowner retains full ownership of the land but 
Coillte provides the necessary management and marketing skills (Coillte, 
2001). Our results suggest that modifications to the scheme which would 
increase further the value of the initial payment to the farmer in return for a 
smaller share of the clearfell profits would enhance its attractiveness to 
potential participants. 
 
The Integration of REPS into Current Forestry Policy 
The analysis suggests that the introduction of REPS is one of the main 
reasons for the decline in the level of private forestry planting in recent 
years. It is essential, therefore, to integrate the current afforestation 
programme and REPS in order to increase the level of private forestry 
planting. 
 
The CAP Rural Development Plan 2000-2006 stated that all areas suitable 
for afforestation on applicant sites for REPS must be reported to the Forest 
Service (Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, 2000a). 
This policy of active identification of potential forestry sites to the 
landowner will itself encourage increased planting. Linkage would be 
further strengthened if REPS payments were withheld on this land so that 
the only way open to farmers to claim premia on eligible land would be to 
plant it with forestry. It is unlikely the EU would permit a cross-linkage 
between schemes in this way as it would deny farmers the right to receive 
an environmental payment even though they were farming that land in 
accordance with the scheme conditions. An alternative approach would be  
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to allow the land planted with forestry to be eligible for both the forest 
premium and REPS payments. This would only be justified, however, if the 
forest management produced environmental benefits over and above those 
which might be expected from normal good forestry management practice.
13 
 
In conclusion, this paper has established that an increase in the level of the 
initial payments to planters is the most cost efficient method of increasing 
the level of forestry planting in Ireland. It was found that the introduction of 
REPS has led to a severe decline in the level of forestry planting in Ireland. 
This paper suggests several policy reforms to increase the level of forestry 
planting in Ireland, including increasing up front payments and reform of 
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13  Payments to farmers under REPS are justified for environmental benefits which arise 
from managing land use and farm practices which go beyond those associated with normal 
good farming practice (Department of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, 2000a).  
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Figures 
Figure 1. The Levels of Total and Private Afforestation in the Period 
1980-2000 
 





















































Table 1. The Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables Used in 
the Regression Analysis 
 
Variables  Units  Average Standard 
Deviation  
Level of Private 
Afforestation Planted  
Hectares  293.63 380.29 
Forestry Market Margin  5% of Net Present Value 
in 1999 prices per ha 
107.05 67.82 
Forestry Planting Grant  £ in 1999 prices per 
hectare 
838.92 330.71 
Forestry Subsidies  Net Present Value in 1999 
prices per ha 
1394.36 1165.52 
Area Entered into REPS  Hectares  9772.89 9407.33 
Agricultural Gross 
Margin 
£ in 1999 prices per 
hectare 
457.83 119.90 
Note: All these variables are the averages of county level data at an 









Table 2. Panel Regression Estimates for Private Afforestation 




Constant   -33.09  3.75  -8.83  0.00 
Forestry Planting 
Grant 
£ in 1999 prices per 
hectare  
2.83 0.36  7.88  0.00 
Forestry Subsidies  Net Present Value 
in 1999 prices per 
ha 
2.12 0.17  12.47  0.00 
Forestry Market 
Margin 
5% of Net Present 
Value in 1999 
prices per ha 
0.03 0.007  4.15  0.00 
Agricultural Gross  
Margin 
£ in 1999 prices per 
hectare 
-0.01 0.53  -0.01  0.99 
Area Entered into 
REPS 
Hectares -0.02  0.002  -10.57  0.00 
R
2 (overall) 0.82        
R
2 (within)
14 0.55         
Note: Dependent variable: Private Afforestation on a County Level (ha) 
per annum in logs 
 
                                                 
14 Not adjusted for robust standard errors, due to the way Stata calculates this measure of 
within variation.  
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Table 3. Marginal Effects at the national level 
Variables  Units  Marginal effect of a one 
unit increase in the 
independent variable 
Forestry Planting Grant  £ in 1999 prices per hectare   25.75 
Forestry Subsidies  Net Present Value in 1999 
prices per ha 
11.63 
Forestry Market Margin  5% of Net Present Value in 
1999 prices per ha 
2.11 
Area Entered into REPS  Hectares  -0.02 
 
 